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In the Utah Court of Appeals

State of Utah,
Case No. 920823-CA

Plaintiff, Respondent
VS.
Priority #2

David Laird Hansen,
Defendant, Appellant

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has Jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Section 78-4-11, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
and Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for a Class A misdemeanor, in
violation Section 41-6-29, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
and for a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Section 41-2-136,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

On November 15, 1991,

defendant was committed to serve 30 days in jail due to his
conviction of the above charges.

On November 21, 1991, defendant

filed a motion for a new trial. The trial court issued an unsigned
minute entry granting the motion and ordering the guilty verdict
set aside.

On January 30, 1992, the court found the defendant

guilty on both counts.

On March 25, 1992, defendant appeared for

sentencing, and the court sentenced defendant in an unsigned order.
On May 6, 1992, the court held a hearing to review the sentence.
The court entered an unsigned order confirming the sentence and
staying sentence for thirty days in case defendant wanted to

appeal.

The defendant filed his notice to appeal on May 8, 1992.

Because the unsigned minute order did not constitute a final order,
the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on September 15,
1992.

A second notice of appeal was filed on November 9, 1992.

Trial in this case was held on January 30, 1992.

At the

conclusion of the state's evidence, the defendant moved for a
dismissal of both counts, arguing that the State had not met its
burden

to

establish

the

corpus

delicti

of

the

crimes

by

independent, clear and convincing evidence prior to admitting the
defendant's confession.

The defendant had previously briefed the

court on the corpus delicti issue.

The court denied defendant's

motion to dismiss and ruled that there was sufficient corroborating
evidence to allow defendant's confession to be admitted. The court
reasoned that the confession and the corroborating evidence could
be taken together to establish the corpus delicti of the crime,
thereby allowing the confession to be used for the further purpose
of establishing identity of the criminal agent. The defendant then
notified the court of his intent to appeal.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
a.

As a matter of law, should the trial court have invoked

the corpus delicti rule to bar the use of defendant's confession in
establishing that a crime had been committed?
b.

Did

the

State

convincing evidence that

establish

by

independent, clear

1) The wrong specified occurred and

and
2)

That the wrong specified was caused by someone's criminal behavior?
Standard of Review:

"Initially we note that trial court's
2

ruling that the corpus delicti rule does not bar admission of
the statements is a question of law, and accordingly, our
standard of review is correctness."

State v. Johnson, 821

P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
A.

There are no determinative constitutional provisions.

B.

Section 41-6-29, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended

states as follows:
(1) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident
resulting in injury to or death of any person shall
immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident
or as close to it as possible and shall immediately
return to and remain at the scene until he has fulfilled
the requirements of Section 41-6-31. The stop may not
obstruct traffic more than is necessary.
(2) A person failing to stop of to comply with the
requirements of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
C.

Section 41-2-136, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended

states as follows:
(1) a person whose license has been denied, suspended,
disqualified, or revoked under this chapter or under the
laws of the state in which his license was issued and who
operates any motor vehicle upon the highways of the state
while that license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or
revoked shall be punished as provided in this section.
(2) A person convicted of violation of Subsection (1),
other than a violation specified in Subsection (3), is
guilty of a class C misdemeanor.
(3) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose
conviction under subsection (1) is based on his operating
a vehicle while his license is suspended, disqualified,
or revoked for:
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical test under
section 41-6-44.10.
D.

Section 77-17-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended

states as follows:
When it appears to the court that there is not sufficient
3

evidence to put a defendant to his defense, it shall
forthwith order him discharged.
E.

Rule 17(o), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, states as

follows:
At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution, or
at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may
issue an order dismissing any information or indictment,
or any count thereof, upon the ground that the evidence
is not legally sufficient to establish the offense
charged therein or any lesser included offense.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Mr. Hansen was tried and convicted at bench trial on January
30, 1992, of leaving the scene of an injury accident and driving
with a suspended license. Independent of Mr. Hansen's confession,
the only evidence presented by the State showed that a single car
rollover occurred on 1-15 North on September 7, 1991, that the car
came to rest on the passenger side of the

ar, that the only

available exit from the car was the driver's door, that an
unidentified man in a blue jacket and red shirt was seen climbing
up and out of that door, and that no witnesses could testify as to
whether the man was the operator or the passenger.

The same man

went to a nearby grove of trees, then recrossed the highway and
hitchhiked north.

There was a second occupant in the car at the

time of the accident and he was thrown from the vehicle and
received mortal injuries to the head.
Approximately 25 hours later police arrested David Laird
Hansen, who was wearing clothes similar to those described by
witnesses the day before.

The State's witnesses did not identify

Mr. Hansen as the person who exited the vehicle, beyond a general
4

description of his clothing and the fact that he had a small cut on
his hand.

Mr. Hansen was arrested after a car in which he was a

passenger was pulled over on 1-15 more than 24 hours after the
accident.

During subsequent questioning by police, Mr. Hansen

stated that he had been driving the car at the time of the
accident.
Based on the foregoing facts, the defendant was convicted of
leaving the scene of an accident and driving with a suspended
license.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant asserts that the trial judge should have granted his
motion to dismiss based on the prosecution's failure to prove the
corpus delicti of the crime by clear and convincing evidence,
independent of the defendant's confession.

The defendant further

asserts that both offenses for which he was convicted contain a
common essential element: The person charged must proven to be the
operator of the vehicle.

The facts of this case are such that,

absent Mr. Hansen's confession, the state offered no proof that Mr.
Hansen was the "operator" of the vehicle.

The State's evidence

(Trial Transcript P.26)

tends only to show that someone wearing a blue jacket and red shirt
exited the car after the accident and then left the scene. If that
person was not the operator, there is no crime. Without clear and
convincing evidence that it was the operator of the vehicle that
left the scene, no corpus delicti of the crimes can be established
sufficient to admit Mr. Hansen's confession into evidence for the
purpose of establishing guilt.
5

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE GRANTED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS BASED ON PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE
CORPUS DELICTI OF THE CRIME INDEPENDENT OF DEFENDANT'S
CONFESSION.

At the end of the prosecution's evidence, counsel for the
defendant moved for a dismissal.

The motion was based on the

defendant's claim that the prosecution had failed to establish the
corpus

delicti

of

the

crime

before

introducing

defendant's

confession, and that without the confession, the State had no proof
that a wrong had been committed.
The corpus delicti

rule has recently been restated and

clarified by the Utah Supreme Court.

"Corpus delicti must be

established through evidence, independent of the confession or
admission, that the * injury specified .... occurred, and that such
injury was caused by someone's criminal conduct'."

State v.

Johnson. 821 P.2d

State v.

1150, 1162

(Utah

1991)

Knoefler, 563 P. 2d 175, 176 (Utah 1977)).

(quoting

The Court examined the

development of Utah's corpus delicti case law and found that State
v. Ferry, 275 P.2d 173 (Utah 1954), "stated the applicable standard
and required a finding of clear and convincing evidence of corpus
delicti...

In summary, our review of post-Ferry cases does not

convince us that the court has moved away from the Ferry clear and
convincing evidence standard."

Johnson, at 1163.

The Johnson rule puts three requirements on the state for
establishing the corpus delicti of the crime:
1.

The state must prove the occurrence of a crime, wrong or
6

injury;
2.

The state must prove that the crime, wrong or injury was

caused by someone's criminal conduct; and
3.

The evidence must be clear and convincing, and independent of

the defendant's confession.
The state's or il y "i ndependent" evidence that even tends to
implicate Mr. Hansen as the operator of vehicle was the testimony
of Mr. Forman that he saw someone exit by the only available door,
which coincidentally was * - driver's dooi . Npit-hPi Hi . McGhie nor
Mr. Forman ever saw the operator of the car; neither testified that
Mr Hansen was the operator.

Neither witness could even identify

Mr. Hansen as the mat i tl lat exited the car, despite testifying that
he passed in front of them at a distance of no more than thirty
feet (30').
Based on the State's Independei -

i 1

^

* is just as likely

that the victim

of the accident was the driver as that Mr. Hansen

was the driver.

The car rolled one and one quarter (1 1/4) times,

which could easily have throw i i, tl: le dri ver f::i : om the c ar and J eft the
passenger inside.
victim, Mr. Mower.

In addition, the car belonged to the accident
A logical inference is that the most likely

person t : be drivi ng w o u M invi nocm t lit. < .tt i, iiwiiMf
The statutes charging the defendant with leaving the scene of
an accident and driving under a suspended license both require as
an element of the crime tl: lat the person ct larged 1 : •€ • t l le "operator11
of the vehicle. If the state cannot present independent, clear and
convincing evidence that Mr. Hansen was driving the car, no corpus
7

delicti has been established that would allow the introduction of
the defendant's confession.

The state did not present any such

evidence.
In State v. Strieby. 790 P.2d 98 (Utah App. 1990), the Court
held that,
"The interplay between Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1982)
and Rule 17(o) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-17(o) (1982)) requires a trial
judge to grant a motion for judgement of acquittal when
the prosecution fails to present enough believable
evidence to put the defendant to her defense. State v.
Smith. 675 P. 2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983).
The state is
required to show some evidence of every element of its
cause of actionf or a lesser included offense, to avoid
an unfavorable directed verdict at the close of its case
in chief." (emphasis added)
Without some clear and convincing evidence placing Mr. Hansen
behind the wheel at the time of the accident, the state has neither
proven the occurrence of a crime nor criminal conduct on the part
of Mr. Hansen.

Therefore, the corpus delicti was not proven by

independent, clear and convincing evidence and the trial court
should not have allowed Mr. Hansen's confession to be used to
establish the corpus delicti of the crime. The tr i^i court should
have granted the defendant's Motion to Dismiss.
II.

THE PROSECUTION PRODUCED NO INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS THE OPERATOR OF THE VEHICLE, WHICH IS AN
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF BOTH CAUSES OF ACTION.

For Leaving the Scene of an Accident the elements of the cause
of action are:
1. The OPERATOR of a vehicle involved in an injury accident will,
2. stop the vehicle at the scene, and
3. remain at the scene and fulfill the requirements of § 41-6-31.
8

For driving with a suspended license the elements of the cause
of action are:
1. A person whose license is suspended,
2. OPERATES a vehicle on the highways,
3. w h i l e t h a t license is s u s p e n d e d .
The

Deputy

Utah

Coui it}

Attorney,

in

her

"'Response

to

D e f e n d a n t ' s M e m o r a n d u m of P o i n t s & A u t h o r i t i e s re C o r p u s D e l i c t i "
d a t e d M a y 5 t h , 1992 stated a t p a g e 6, "The o n l y e l e m e n t for w h i c h
the

confession

w a s helpi .

driver/operator

defendar

of t h e v e h i c l e

involved

identity

as the

in t h e a c c i d e n t . "

The

defendant wholeheartedly agrees with the County Attorney that the
c o n f e s s i o n is t h e only e v i d e n c e the State I las :>f t ..he m o s t e s s e n t i a l
e l e m e n t of t h e c a u s e of a c t i o n :

That M r . Hansen was the OPERATOR

of t h e v e h i c l e .
T h e S t a t e c a n n o t charge
an

accident,

license.

nor

with

The burden

• passenger with leaving the scene of

operating

a

vehicle

under

a

suspended

is o n t h e state t o p r o v e t h a t a c r i m e w a s

c o m m i t t e d b e f o r e i n t r o d u c i n g a d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n f e s s i o n to e s t a b l i s h
his guilt

The only

way to prove

that the victim

was not the

o p e r a t o r is t o i n t r o d u c e t h e c o n f e s s i o n , w h i c h is b a r r e d until t h e
state proves a crime was committed.

similar

f a i l u r e t o e s t a b l i s h c o r p u s d e l i c t i , t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t of U t a h h a s
s t a t e d t h a t "Our t r a d i t i o n a l zeal in s a f e g u a r d i n g t h e r i g h t s of an
. .anc.jl basis. 1 1

a c c u s e d w o u l d p r e c l u d e convictio.
S t a t e v . F e r r y , 275 P.2d 173 (Utah
IiI

Ferry

the defendant

was

9

1954).
charged

with

unlawful

carnal

knowledge. A deputy sheriff testified that the defendant answered
"yes" when the girl involved had asked defendant if it were right
that they have sexual relations.
girl testified at the trial.

Neither the defendant nor the

The Court wrote that:

"The only independent evidence which might tend to
establish a corpus delicti and lend credence to the
confession here, is the testimony of the deputy, the
substance of which, at best, was the statement of a
person that refused to appear and subject herself to
cross-examination, thus precluding the test of any truth
of the statement purportedly made or the veracity of the
one who made it. Such hearsay, even though admissible...
in our opinion falls far short of the quantum and quality
of independent evidence which the authorities require in
proving the corpus delicti before a confession may be
used to establish guilt."
The above quote reflects directly on the core problem with the
case at bar. The only clear and convincing evidence that the state
offered at trial to prove that Mr. Hansen was the operator of the
vehicle was the Highway Patrolman's testimony as to the confession.
Because Mr. Hansen is not required to take the stand and undergo
cross-examination, the confession is not subject to verification of
veracity, creating the danger of conviction on a false confession.
It is for this very reason that conviction is not allowed on a
defendant's confession without clear and convincing

evidence that

a crime has been committed and that the crime was the result of
criminal behavior.
III. THE EVIDENCE IN THE PRESENT CASE DOES NOT RISE TO THE
LEVEL REQUIRED BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN PREVIOUS
CORPUS DELICTI CASES.
In other cases involving the corpus delicti rule, the Utah
Supreme Court has required a showing of substantial evidence that
10

a crime has been committed before the defendant's confession could
be admitted for purposes of identity.

The evidence in the case at

hand does not rise to the level required

a corpus delicti.

In State v. Anderson, 561 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1977), the court
allowed the admissions of the defendant to be entered only because
the independent evidence was so substantial that the trier of fact
could hardly have entertained any doubt as to who was driving the
vehicle.

The evidence showed that although there was nobody under

the wheel of the defendant's ti

passenger • : i tl: le Dther =;1 < ie

of the front seat was bleeding heavily and there were pools of
blood on that side of the truck.
The passenger door was damaged -HM! W U U M nut upwn, the trui.K
had not rolled, and the driver was questioned while still at the
scene of the accident.

"Had the other person in the truck been

driving, it is obvious that the appellaul

wuul 1 have found it

necessary to exchange place^^with 1liin since the right hand door
could not be opened.

And since there was no blood on the driver's

side and none on the appellant- it would strai i i tl n = cre< ii i] :i try : i: < i
juror to have any doubt as to who was the driver." Id. at 1062-63.
As a result of that finding, the court allowed the defendant's
confession to be admitted.
The disparity between the evidence in Anderson and the present
case is very revealing.

In the case at bar nobody remained in the

car, making it impossible to determine who w.i;>, the iJnver.

Mr.

Hansen was not identified at the scene by police or any other
witnesses and was not arrested or questioned until twenty six hours
11

later.
The car had also rolled and landed on its side, further
(Trial Transcript P. 36)
diluting any inference that a person seen leaving by the only
available door was the driver.

The prosecution also attempted to

elicit testimony from Officer Macaphie to indicate whether any
(Trial Transcript P. 38)
blood was found inside the passenger side of the car. No blood was
found inside on the passenger side.

The only blood found was on

the ground where Mr. Mower, the victim, had been thrown from the
car. The facts of the present case are so readily distinguishable
from Anderson that is logical to infer that the evidence against
Mr. Hansen does not rise to required level to establish the corpus
delicti.
Another case that illustrates the quantum and quality of
evidence necessary to establish corpus delicti is State v. Cooleyr
603 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979).
sexual abuse.
state

had

not

The defendant was convicted of forcible

He appealed, based partly on his claim that the
proven

corpus

delicti

before

admitting

his

inculpatory confession. The Supreme Court held that the testimony
of the victim's father that he saw the defendant with his hands on
the victim's panties satisfied the requirement for proving corpus
delicti.

Cooley is distinguishable from the current case because

there is no direct testimonial evidence placing Mr. Hansen under
the wheel driving the car.

Therefore,

the

State

is

relying

solely on Mr. Hansen's post-crime confession to establish that the
person who left the scene was the operator of the car.

Without

that confession there is no evidence that either of the "operator"
12

offenses complained of actually occurred.
Requiring this level of evidence does not mean that the State
can never convict a criminal with* r

* less. What it means

is that the quantum and quality of corroborating evidence must be
clear and convincing enough to establish the commission of a crime,
independent iI

i defendant's confession.

This is sound public

policy because it protects people who feel pressured
confession,

those

who

make

convicted without the requisite

false
-

into a

admissions, from

-i

being

rime ar

»f

criminal behavior.
The unsettling complication in this case is inherent to a
narrow group of limited crimes that reijutii" identification of the
criminal agent as an element of the cause of action. Therefore, a
finding of no corpus delicti and a reversal of the trial court
would properly be limited to that narrow qiuup uf crimes.

The

Supreme Court of the United States has recognized the existence of
such a group of crimes and enunciated a more protective corpus
delicti rule to deal with them.
In Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 154, 99 L.ed. 192,
199,

75 S. Ct. 194 (1954), the Court addressed the corpus delicti

rule in the context of a tax fraud case wtiet H tiii- identify ot Hie
taxpayer was an element of the cause of action.

The Court

recognized that:
"as to this crime, it cannot be shown that the crime has
been committed without identifying the accused. Thus we
are faced with the choice of either applying the
corroboration rule to this offense and according the
accused even greater protection than the rule affords to
a defendant in a homicide prosecution, (string cite
13

omitted), or of finding the rule wholly inapplicable
because of the nature of the offense, stripping the
accused of this guarantee altogether. We choose to apply
the rule, with its broader guarantee, to crimes ....
where the corroborative evidence must implicate the
accused in order to show that a crime has been
committed." Smith, 99 L.ed. 192, 199.
The case at bar is a crime where the "corroborative evidence
must implicate the accused" as the operator of the vehicle or the
charges cannot stand.

Independent of the defendant's inculpatory

statements, the State's evidence only showed that a man, who was
equally likely to have been the passenger as the driver, exited the
vehicle and left the scene.

Other

than

the

post-arrest

admissions, the only evidence that tends to indicate Mr. Hansen was
the other occupant of the vehicle is a general description of the
clothing worn by the second occupant of the car.

However, the

evidence has a rather stale connection to Mr. Hansen, considering
that absent his confession, Mr. Hansen was not identified as
wearing similar clothing until more than a day later. And because
Utah is a state where many people dress "western style", it is not
unlikely that any number of men on 1-15 each day are wearing red
plaid shirts and blue denim jackets.
It is evident from the trial record that the judge recognized
Mr. Hansen's unique dilemma in seeking the protection of the corpus
delicti guarantee in this case. The judge noted that the question
of the operator and the identity of the person committing the
offense must be answered the same in order to convict.

Despite

that realization, the trial court chose to admit the confession for
purposes of identifying the operator.
14

The court stated that

sufficient corroborating evidence had been presented and that the
confession is what "makes the difference." Trial Transcript at pg.
60.
The only corroborating evidence presented at trial, other than
the confession, merely tended to put someone in the car who was
wearing clothes similar to clothes worn by Mr. Hansen the next day.
The evidence did not in any way indicate that the similarly dressed
person was the operator of the car.
it is just as likely that

From the evidence presented,

the person was the passenger, and

perhaps more likely considering that the victim was the owner of
the car.
The admission of the confession was therefore error, because
each element of the corpus delicti, including the element of the
identity of the operator, must be established by independent, clear
and convincing evidence before a post-arrest confession can be
entered as evidence of guilt. The trial court should have applied
the Smith rule, with its broader protections for this narrow
criminal context. By not applying the Smith rule, the trial court
accomplished precisely what the Smith Court decided should be
avoided

in

these

cases:

The

defendant

received

protection under the corpus delicti guarantee.
oriented

decision

should

be reversed

and

diminished

Such a result

its lower standard

denounced as wholly unacceptable.
To reverse the trial court's judgement would be in keeping
with the Utah Supreme Court's direction that "in deference to the
time honored and important precept of our law that it is better
15

that ten guilty go free, than one innocent be punished, we feel
there is wisdom in requiring proof of corpus delicti independent of
a confession as a precaution against convicting the innocent..."
State v. Weldonr 314 P.2d 353, 356 (Utah 1957).
CONCLUSION
The corpus delicti rule imparts to the State the burden of
proving, independent of a defendant's confession, that 1) A wrong
or injury was done, and 2) That the wrong or injury was the result
of someone's criminal behavior.

When the identity of the

defendant is a necessary element of the crime which the State seeks
to prove, the Smith rule from the United States Supreme Court
should afford broader protection to the defendant than the normal
corpus delicti guarantee.

Smith requires that the prosecution

prove the identity element of the crime by clear and convincing
means other than the defendant's own confession. The State has not
met that burden.

The investigation into the identity of the

vehicle's operator apparently stopped with the confession of Mr.
Hansen, a prosecutorial practice that could erode the protection
afforded

to

confession.

the

common

Based

on

man

against

the

foregoing

conviction
facts,

on

the

a

false

Defendant

respectfully urges this Court to reverse the above convictions in
this case and dismiss this case with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted this _ *>

day of February, 1993.

&

CLEVE J. HATCH
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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CLEVE J. HATCH
ELKINS & ASSOCIATES
60 East 100 South, Suite 100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 374-1212

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Case Number 920823-CA
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
DAVID LAIRD HANSEN,

Priority #2

Defendant and Appellant,
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
The following documents are submitted as an addendum to Appelant7s
brief herein:
1.

Judgment and Sentence entered into on October 28, 1992.

2.

Response to Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities
RE Corpus Delecti filed by the Utah County Atorney on May 5,
1992.

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

vs.
DAVID LAIRD HANSEN,

Case No. 911001003

Defendant.
APPEARANCES:

)

Claudia Laycock, Deputy County Attorney
Defendant present with Cleve Hatch as Counsel

On the basis of Non-Jury Trial verdict of Guilty on 1-30-92
defendant was convicted of the offense of:
COUNT

I:

COUNT II:

LEAVING THE SCENE OF AN INJURY ACCIDENT, a Class A
Misdemeanor; and
DRIVING ON SUSPENSION, a Class B Misdemeanor.

No Legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be
pronounced, the Court now adjudges the above defendant guilty of
said offense and sentences defendant as follows:
The defendant is sentenced to serve 1 year
in the Utah County
Jail on Count I and to serve 6 months on Count II.
The sentence is stayed pending a review on May 6, 1992, at 10:00
a.m.

DATED:

October 28, 1992
BY THE COURT:

H , AMI

^JJs^K/C-e-sr"- '^N^UYVVV^
CIRCUIT JUDGE
DGE

\\

- •>*

FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

vs.
DAVID LAIRD HANSEN,

Case No.

911001003

Defendant.
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

with postage thereon prepaid on this 28th

day of

October

1992 to the following interested parties, at the addresses
indicated below, to-wit:
Claudia Laycock, 100 E. Center, Suite 2100, Provo, Utah 84606
Cleve Hatch 40 South 100 West, Suite 200, Provo, Utah 84601

Karen D. Hansen
Assistant Clerk of Court

KAY BRYSONf #0473
Utah County Attorney
CLAUDIA LAYCOCK, #0473
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 370-8026

IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT
STATE OF UTAHf
:
:

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES RE CORPUS
DELICTI

Plaintiff,
vs.

:
Case No. 911001003

DAVID LAIRD HANSEN,
Defendant(s).

:

COMES NOW, the Plaintiff through its counsel, Claudia
Laycock, Deputy Utah County Attorney, and submits the following
Answer to Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities on
Corpus Delicti.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, David Laird Hansen was tried to the bench,
Judge Robert Sumsion residing, on January 30, 1992.

On September

7, 19 91 two gentlemen, Jerry McGhie and Robert Foreman, were
standing in front of the Lone Peak Trailers sales lot, which is
located on the frontage road west of 1-15 and just north of the
Alpine exit in northern Utah County, when they heard the sound of
a car crashing at approximately 2:50pm.

Mr. McGhie testified

that he first saw a man come across the south bound lanes of 1-15
running towards a group of trees.

When he first noticed this man

running, the man had just barely left the center median of the
freeway. He watched him jump the fence at the edge of the freeway
to get to the frontage road.

Mr. McGhie went into the office of

the business establishment and called 911 for help.

After he

returned to the sales lot he asked Mr. Foreman what had happened
to the man from the car.
of him running north.

He then saw the same man pass in front

This same man crossed back over to the

north bound side of 1-15 and began hitchhiking about a half block
north of the accident.
up this man.

He observed as a car stopped and picked

The man was wearing a Levi-type jacket with a red

shirt that was hanging out.

The vehicle which had crashed was

resting on its passenger side.
Mr. Foreman testified that he saw a man climb out of the
driver's side of the vehicle, which was resting on its passenger
side.

The man then ran west to the frontage road and jumped the

fence and hid by a group of trees.

Soon after, the same man ran

past him and Mr. Foreman smelled a strong odor of alcohol coming
from the running man.

The man then went further north and

crossed 1-15 and started hitchhiking northbound on the freeway.
He did not observe the man as he was able to get ride.

He

described the man as wearing a blue Levi jacket and reddish shirt
that was hanging out.
his right hand.

He also stated that the man had blood on

He was very certain that it was the same man who

went into the trees who came out.
Trooper Mike Rees of the Utah Highway Patrol was called to
the scene and arrived as the first officer on the scene.

He

found a victim of the one-car accident lying close to the car.
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By that time, the car had been rolled back to its wheels by
observers who trying to help the victim of the accident.

Trooper

Lynn McAfee, also of the Utah Highway Patrol, was called out to
the scene of this accident.

He was then dispatched to the

American Fork Hospital and there was informed by the doctor the
victim had died.

He interviewed the defendant, David Laird

Hansen, the next day, September 8, 1991.

After advising the

defendant of this Miranda rights, Trooper McAfee interviewed the
defendant, who admitted to the officer that he was the driver of
the vehicle involved in this accident, and that he had run
because he was scared.

He claimed that he had been on his way to

Orem to contact the police regarding this accident when he was
arrested.

He further said victim had been very drunk and had

grabbed the steering wheel.

He also claimed that he, Mr. Hansen,

had overcorrected when the pulled the wlieel back and that he then
lost control of the vehicle.

Trooper McAfee described the

defendant's clothes at the time of the arrest as levis, a red
plaid shirt, and a blue levi jacket.

The defendant also had

small cuts one hand.
After hearing all evidence, the defendant was found guilty
on both counts by Judge Sumsion.
QUESTION BEFORE THE COURT
Did the State fulfill the requirements of the doctrine of
corpus delicti before it introduced the confession of the
defendant, David Laird Hansen?
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CORPUS DELICTI CASE LAW IN UTAH
According to the recent case of State v. Johnson, 173 Utah
Adv. Rep. 3, 11 (1991), "Under the Utah corpus delicti rule,
before postcrime inculpatory statements are admissible, the State
must show by clear and convincing evidence that (i) a wrong was
done and (ii) such wrong was the result of criminal conduct."
This coincides with the rule stated in State v. Rebeterano, 681
P2d 1265 (Utah 1984), which defendant's counsel quotes in his
Memorandum.

"The state has the burden of proving the corpus

delicti of a crime, i.e., that the injury specified in the crime
occurred, and that such injury was caused by someone's criminal
conduct." IdL_ at 1267, quoting State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175,
176 (1977).
The corpus delicti rule also states that, before a
defendant's confession can be introduced as evidence, the State
must prove the occurrence of a crime.

Although "corpus delicti

must be established through evidence independent of the
confession or admission . . . (u)nder our prior cases, the State
is not required to show independent evidence 'that the accused
was the guilty agent.'" State v. Johnson at 9.
According to State v. Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175, 176 (1977),
the requirement of independent proof demands only that the State
present evidence that the injury specified in the crime occurred,
and that such injury was caused by someone's criminal conduct.
An admission or confession is admissible to connect an accused
with the crime committed; but the connection of the accused with
the crime need not be proved to establish the corpus delicti."
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In other words, there is no law which requires the State to prove
the identity of the "wrongdoer" before presenting the confession
into evidence.
In an earlier case, State v. Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010, 1014
(1938),

which is still adhered to by the Utah courts (see State

v. Johnson, supra at 9 ) , the court explains that a criminal case
requires the State to prove three facts before it is entitled to
go to the jury or have a verdict in its favor.

These "facts are:

(1) a wrong, an injury, or a damage has been done; (2) that such
was effected by a criminal agency: i.e., without right or by
unlawful means; (3) that the accused perpetrated the wrong, or
aided or abetted therein, i.e., that the accused was the guilty
agent."

The court further reveals that a confession "serves as

evidence, and if believed, as sufficient proof of the third point
of proof, the identity of the guilty agent.

It may also . . . be

evidence of either or both of the first and the second points to
be proved.

(However) there must be independent evidence of the

first and second points, commonly called the corpus delicti."
This points out that the third test is separate from the first
two and is not necessary to prove the requisite corpus delicti.
ARGUMENT
Substantial and persuasive evidence was adduced at trial
to show that there had been a wrong or injury or damage committed
and that such had been effected by criminal agency (unlawful
means).

The two witnesses standing at the sales lot of the

trailer sales establishment both saw the defendant coming from
the location of the single-vehicle accident.

- 5 -

Mr. Foreman

testified more specifically that he saw a man climb out of the
driver's side of the vehicle.

Both witnesses saw this same man

run to the side of the road, run past them at the trailer sales
lot, cross back over the road, and start hitchhiking.

Mr. McGhie

even saw this same man get into a car and continue north in that
vehicle.

There was a person injured in the vehicle, who was not

the defendant.
The only element for which the confession was helpful was
the defendant's identity as the driver/operator of the vehicle
involved in the accident.

There was sufficient collaborating

evidence testified to at trial to allow the introduction of the
defendant's confession to Trooper McAfee.

The defendant was seen

climbing out of the driver's side of the vehicle, while the
injured person was found close the passengers side of the
vehicle.

The defendant's actions in immediately leaving the

scene, rather than staying to see to the safety of the other
injured person, also corroborated his involvement in the accident
and his concern over facing the consequences of that accident.
These actions were consistent with those of the operator of a
vehicle who was concerned about his culpability in the accident.
Such concerns would not be shared by a passenger.
The corpus delicti was adequately dealt with by the State
before the introduction of the defendant's confession.

The

defendant's confession merely served to corroborated those facts
that were already before the Court and to more conclusively
establish just one element of the crime of leaving the scene of
an injury accident.
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CONCLUSION
The State respectfully urges this Court to
defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

deny

This Court did not err in

admitting the defendant's confession into evidence,
DATED this c5^v_day of May, 1992.

Claudia Laycock
Deputy Utah County attorney

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Response to Defendant's Memorandum
of Points and Authorities re Corpus Delicti to Public Defender,
40 South 100 West, Ste 200, Provo, Utah 84601 this S"sH^_^day of
, 1992.
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